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The principle question informing this paper is: how will the West in general, 
and Britain and Australia in particular, deal with the ever increasing threat of  
terrorist strikes, and simultaneously support increasing Muslim populations 
within their national borders? The question prompts an examination of the 
increasing tensions both within Islamic countries and countries such as Britain 
and Australia. Britain has recently experienced a new phenomenon of ‘home-
grown’ terror suspects releasing renewed public anxiety and calls for 
tolerance by Prime Minister Blair. At the same time, the government is 
considering a project meant to tackle mass social and political disaffection 
amongst the UK’s 1.6 million Muslims. Its aim is more narrowly conceived, 
however, with its primary purpose seen as curbing the influence of Islamic 
fundamentalism. The problem of alarmingly high levels of social and political 
alienation amongst British Muslims is a key indicator of potential recruitment 
by radical clerics. The aim of the government is to isolate Islamic 
fundamentalists, while co-opting what are defined as more moderate Muslim 
elements from within the clergy and the Muslim political elite, in a classic 
struggle of divide-and-rule. The aim of this paper is to examine this strategy 
for its utility in achieving social harmony between British Muslims and easing 
public concern and antagonism towards Muslims. The broad principles of the 
model will be applied to Australian conditions and comparisons will be made 
with the most recent moves by the Australian government to reduce the threat 
of extremist activity and quell public anxiety. 
 
 
Keywords: terrorism; legislation; Islam; Australian Muslims; counter-terrorism 
 
Contact details: Dave Lawson 
    de.lawson@qut.edu.au 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Paul Kelly (2005) identifies two traps we need to avoid. “One is succumbing 
to the right-wing backlash that targets Muslims as a group and divides our 
society by erecting new barriers to their integration. The other trap lies in the 
prejudice of the anti-Howard, anti-Blair, and anti-Bush Left and its false claim 
that the West is responsible for this war, a claim that is dangerous because it 
assumes one can appease or negotiate with jihadists whose objective is 
mass murder. Bin Laden’s strategy rests on his declared conviction that the 
West is corrupt, decadent, weak and will fold. The only response is a blend of 
the dignity and strength on display in London.” 
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The London bombings on the 7th July, 2005 provoked political responses not only in 
Britain but also Australia. The concept of ‘home-grown’ terrorists placed a greater 
emphasis on internally inspired terror activity as opposed to the more conventional 
‘imported’ terrorists. Public and political anxiety associated with the possibility of 
‘British national’ terrorist activity promoted an Australian political response with a 
focus on local Muslim communities as both a source of potential terrorists, and as 
potential identifiers of terrorist activity. A major political response in both countries 
was to develop stronger counter-terrorism measures in the form of proposed 
legislated Acts. Ostensibly this was to provide added public safeguards and 
increased police powers to assist in preventing further ‘home-grown’ attacks.  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the responses to the post-London bombing 
tragedy from the perspective of newspaper coverage in the weeks following the 
event. The purpose is to examine how the events in Britain influenced Australian 
responses, which appear similar in political aspects, but different from a sociological 
perspective. Arguably, the Australian terror threat is not comparable with the threat in 
Britain. Significant points of debate include the phenomenon of ‘home-grown’ 
terrorists; the extent to which a threat has been identified; and the expediency of 
Australia to follow Britain’s lead in introducing “draconian anti-terrorism laws” 
(Glendinning, 2005). But in the case of ‘home grown’ terrorists, the issue is not just 
one of a legislative response, but to promote the idea of understanding the 
underlying social factors influencing young extremists and the evolution of their 
‘terrorist careers’.  
 
This article suggests a mismatch of policy, legislative and political responses 
following the British experience. By not taking into account substantial differences in 
Australian terrorist-related conditions, proposed changes will tend to polarize 
sections of the community and help maintain fear and suspicion towards Muslims in 
general. This article further suggests the Australian response post 7/7 is one based 
on limiting future political fallout, rather than providing substantive terror-related 
protection.   
 
 
Methodological and analytical focus  
 
 
The methodology involves thematic analysis of British and Australian online 
broadsheet newspaper commentary with supporting government reports, media 
releases and reports. The Guardian (UK), Timesonline, The Australian, and The 
Sydney Morning Herald are sources for this exercise. The main analytical focus is the 
British experience in the immediate aftermath of the London bombings on the 7th July 
2005, and how Australia has copied certain British counter-terrorism procedures. The 
Blair government quickly enlisted moderate Muslims to help win support for 
“unprecedented encroachment into mosques, Islamic schools and community 
organisations” (Baldwin and Webster, 2005). The Australian Prime Minister, John 
Howard called a summit of Islamic leaders in the wake of the London bombings, in 
response to the probability of the same thing happening in Australia. Both 
government leaders were accused of failing to invite a more representative cross-
section of Muslim communities. Tony Blair failed to invite “younger and more 
representative voices” (Correspondent, 2005), and John Howard by excluding 
representatives of “the vast Turkish community; the Lebanese Muslims Association; 
the various youth organisations; the Islamic school system; and organisations 
espousing more conservative interpretations of Islam” (Butler, 2005). Two issues of 
concern arise at this point: those of a civil rights nature including the possibility of 
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discrimination and freedom to express political dissent; and the unrepresentative 
nature of the thirteen hand-picked Muslims described as “Australia’s moderate 
Muslim leadership” (ibid.).  
 
The degree to which Australian responses align with those of the British indicates a 
resigned inevitability of similar terrorist strategies being attempted in this country. 
This is based on the laws of probability rather than “the government having no 
intelligence of an imminent attack” (Kerin, 2005). Yet they also indicate a willingness, 
or reluctance, as the case may be, to understand the broader issues confronting 
Islam and the West in general and Australia in particular. The importance of 
restraining overt expressions of hostility cannot be overstated, but a key deciding 
success factor lies with how subtle political responses are interpreted and applied in 
the cause of ‘national interest’. It is my contention that domestic politics are now 
more firmly linked to global events, particularly since strikes by radical extremists set 
the precedent for homeland strikes in the US, and following Bali and Madrid, the 
London bombings have raised the stakes in terms of the new identity of ‘home-
grown’ terror suspects. Both British and Australian Prime Ministers have expressed 
grave concern for this ‘new’ mutation of terror strategy, and the implications and 
reactions may have serious consequences if not handled with sensitivity and care. 
The immediate issue at hand is to limit populist expressions of hostility towards 
Muslims and Islamic infrastructure, but this depends on longer-term public and 
political acceptance of separating Islamophobia from Islamo-fascism; terminology 
which somewhat crudely identifies opposing perspectives of the same problem.  
 
  
Identifying underlying global issues 
 
 
Most Muslims are horrified their religion has been captured by radical Islamists 
manifesting in the suicide bomber phenomenon. These acts stem from an inability of 
some adherents of Islam to accept an open-minded cultural and political adjustment 
of Islam to European standards. Bassam Tibi (2001) suggests the emergence of 
‘Euro-Islam’ is hindered by Islamic fundamentalism, creating a ‘serious security 
problem’ both for Islamic countries and for the Western states to which they migrate. 
Tibi contends that Islam has, in response to modernity, been politicised. The process 
of politicisation, as he sees it, is an expression of the predicament Islam finds itself in 
as a result of oscillating between culture and politics, an impasse in which  moderate 
or progressive as well as conservative Islamists are enmeshed (2001).       
Essentially, Tibi sees European modernity as the standard and the ultimate frame of 
reference for Muslims wanting to benefit from Western civilisation. Tibi’s argument 
that a democratic political order does not exist in Islam is not new but this stance is 
the root of much soul-searching within Islamic thinking and conflict within Muslim 
societies. The reversion to a strict Taliban-style adherence belies the fact that the 
majority of Muslims are able to hold firm their Islamic principles without reverting to 
extremism.  
 
Complicated combinations of social, cultural, political, and religious factors exist for 
the emergence of extremism in any ethnic or religious environment, yet the most 
recent manifestations attributed to radical Islamists are creating particular problems 
in the West. Nevertheless, the tension within Islam is mirrored in the West and is 
rising on two main fronts. Firstly, there is the slow but steady realisation that this form 
of terror is possibly here to stay and is almost impossible to prevent. The second is 
how to instil public confidence in the fact that law abiding moderate Muslims are not 
part of the problem. Yet recent history is littered with examples of spiteful retaliation 
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on those who appear as the popular image of an ‘Islamic terrorist’.  Wilkinson, Davies 
and Clennell (2005) note “antagonism towards Muslims since the London bombings 
has shocked more moderate leaders here, and they have been stung by criticism that 
they have not done enough to curb extremism”. A significant problem for Muslim 
minority western states is how to deal with the increasing potential threat of terrorist 
strikes, and simultaneously support increasing Muslim populations within national 
borders. It would be naïve to suggest this is a problem of individual western liberal 
democratic nation-states, although it would be easy to believe if the media coverage 
of the London bombings is used as an example. Widespread media reportage 
suggests the west is alarmed at its apparent powerlessness to effectively identify and 
prevent attacks on both symbolic and physical infrastructure.  
 
One possible explanation may be that the immediate post-WW11 optimism and 
desire for stability is no longer, and that the paradox of economic and capitalist 
expansion has both created the delusion of accomplishment and the reality of 
meaninglessness. The war on terror is a telling example of the folly of relying on an 
idealistic belief in market forces, and their inherent desire for certainty, to provide a 
harmonious and safe future. A difficult proposition to accept is that the same 
destructive forces unleashed by untrammelled economic expansion are not equated 
with similar destructive forces associated with Islamic integration into global capitalist 
frameworks. Islam, as one of the all-time great faiths is being slowly but surely 
implicated in the turbulence of late modernity. It should be no surprise that this is so, 
at least from a western perspective. Islam is on the defensive, both within Islamic 
majority states and countries such as Britain, North America, and Australia. On one 
hand there is an implicit association of ‘Islam’ with intrigue, suspicion, and fear. It falls 
on the shoulders of moderate and law-abiding Muslims to deal with the waves of 
discrimination and vilification following so-called al-Qa’eda styled terror attacks. On 
the other hand, it is undeniable new generations of inspired and motivated terrorists 
are following the operational strategies honed by Bin Laden. Caught in between are 
governments whose options are limited in terms of absolute prevention, but quite 
flexible in terms of legislative responses. The invariable strengthening of counter-
terrorism laws may serve a political purpose but their actual effectiveness is 
questionable despite them being designed “to enable us to better deter, prevent, 
detect and prosecute acts of terrorism” (Howard, 2005). 
 
 
What has Australia learned from the London bombings? 
 
 
The London bombings have brought the threat of terrorism much closer to Australia, 
despite the obvious geographic contradiction. Prime Minister Howard was ‘on 
location’ when the London bombings occurred, just as he witnessed the attack on the 
Pentagon on 11 September. Despite the massive death toll of 9/11 Australia 
remained geographically isolated, and politically uninvolved. It was the Bali attack 
that sounded alarm bells for our region, but the events of 7/7 reinforced our 
awareness of vulnerability, at least at a political level. The differences between 
‘imported’ and ‘home-grown’ terrorist personnel appear to have increased political 
and public anxiety. The London bombings were carried out by alleged British 
nationals, igniting a resurgence of public and political introspection and reactive 
security measures. Adverse reactions included the shooting of a suspected terrorist 
who proved to be unconnected in any way with terrorism. But these events 
introduced a new concept in the terror debate: that of a British national as a 
perpetrator. However, reference is made here to the 22nd December 2002 American 
Airlines Flight 63 and the role of British self-confessed Islamic fundamentalist Richard 
Colvin Reid, also known as the shoe bomber. Reid was indicted as an al-Qa’eda-
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trained terrorist who attempted to destroy Flight 63 with explosive devices concealed 
in his shoes (Ashcroft, 2002). More recently, border security now ranks with internal 
security as a priority for surveillance and intelligence operations. This evolving issue 
posed by the so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorist is evoking a resurgence of 
introspection regarding British identity, multiculturalism, education, religious alliances 
and immigration policy. Prior to the London bombings but after the Bali incident 
Australia’s security environment was perceived as changed, regional, transnational, 
and evolving. Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah are cited as a  regional threat 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004) but the London bombings added the 
possibility of an Australian ‘home grown’ terrorism event creating its own variation of 
introspection, fear, scapegoats and political responses.  
 
 
British and Australian responses and reactions 
 
 
Australia’s symbolic alliance with Britain possibly helped fuel similar national 
sentiment in the post-London bombing environment. As in Britain, media coverage 
focussed on ‘local’ Muslims as a potential ‘threat’, although care was taken to 
discriminate between moderate law-biding Muslims and those with radical 
viewpoints. This shift in emphasis from a transnational/regional threat to an internally 
derived threat also meant new political explanatory measures were required to 
account for this turn of events. Much has been documented regarding the externality 
of the terror threat in Australia. Alexander Downer (2004:v) notes in his foreword to 
Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia: 
 
The threat Australia now faces – and most directly experienced through the 
tragedy of the 2002 Bali bombings – is transnational. It is terrorism of a 
previously unknown scale. It is a different kind of conflict, perpetrated in the 
name of a Muslim extremist cause. We must understand it if we are to defeat 
it. 
 
It could be argued that one form of understanding now requires a more rigorous 
analysis of Australian Muslim communities as a response to the ‘home-grown’ threat. 
It is recognised, however, that Australian internal security organisations would most 
likely be aware of potential risk individuals and groups due to its infiltration of select 
Muslim communities and Mosques. Although this is a presumption of effective and 
professional surveillance activity based on the most up to date intelligence, it is also 
in line with covert operations in the global counter-terrorism project of damage 
limitation. This supposition raises significant issues.  
 
Firstly, if the intelligence community is reasonably well-informed of potential terror 
cells or sleepers in this country, then it remains as a covert or organisational matter 
and unconnected to public discussion, media coverage or mainstream Muslim 
involvement. However, this issue has been canvassed in the Australian media to the 
extent that “counter-terrorism analysts have suggested that Australia lacks the critical 
mass of migrant populations to harbour suicide bombers on the scale of Britain” 
(Kerin, 2005). This has been supported by Aldo Borgu (2005) (Program Director, 
Operations and Capability, Australian Strategic Policy Institute) who acknowledges 
firstly that: “given the sheer scale of the attacks of 9/11 it has also been automatically 
assumed that all democratic countries – and also some not so democratic ones – 
faced an equally recognised threat of terrorism” (2005: 1). Borgu follows with a later 
statement: 
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…before the government develops overarching strategies to combat the 
threat and before they develop specific measures to counter the threat, they 
need to clearly understand and define what the threat actually is. 
 
 
The Attorney-General Philip Ruddock noted that “there had been no warnings of 
imminent suicide bombing threats, but added Australia was obviously of interest to 
terrorists” (cited in Kerin, 2005). Mr Ruddock (cited in Kerin, 2005) then added: “If 
you surmise that beyond that, intelligence agencies keep us informed of other 
matters of concern…”. 
  
The above statement followed comments by John Howard that “Australians could 
face suicide bombings despite the Government having no intelligence of an imminent 
attack” (Kerin, 2005). Kerin also cites Singapore-based terrorism expert Rohan 
Gunaratna “that while there were radical elements in Australian communities, he 
(Gunaratna) did not believe there were operational terrorist cells present” (2005). 
These are difficult statements to analyse because the government would naturally be 
reluctant underestimate the threat in light of previous overseas terror attacks. Yet the 
apparent advice it is receiving appears less alarming and more strategic, but as 
Borgu notes: “the government’s position is to officially play down the role that so-
called ‘root causes’ have in spreading the threat of terrorism” (Borgu, 2005: 5). Root 
causes have been identified in Britain, however, in the post 7/7 analysis in that 
country. On the one hand commentary by Daniel Pipes suggests Britain harbours 
terror because of “London’s refusal to shut down its Islamist terrorist infrastructure or 
extradite wanted operatives” (2005). Pipes (2005) compares the ‘hapless’ British with 
the ‘stalwart’ nature of the French nation in their respective responses to terrorism 
and radical Islam. Underlying this assertion is the strength of French heritage, and 
the loss of British heritage. Pipes (ibid.) cites the British ban on fox hunting and the 
French ban on hijabs as examples and continues: 
 
The former embraced multiculturalism, the latter retain a pride in their historic 
culture. This contrasts in matters of identity makes Great Britain the Western 
country most vulnerable to the ravages of radical Islam, whereas France, for 
all its political failings, has retained a sense of self that may yet see it 
through.   
 
This British-French example invites a comparison with Australia in terms of its 
national attitude to the true intent of multiculturalism and its attachment to ‘core 
Australian values’. It also raises the question of responses to perceived threats in 
relation to public understanding of the risks. From the outset it could be argued that 
the risk is overplayed and government responses use fear as a catalyst for its 
disproportionate emphasis on a minimally conceived risk. It also relates to continued 
attempts to assert its ‘Australian core values’ agenda which is linked to its 
problematic multicultural policy. A further link could be attributed to an outcome of the 
Australian ‘Muslim summit’ whereby Australian trained clerics will be encouraged to 
“reinforce the Australian values of tolerance and harmony within Islamic 
communities” (Hao, 2005). On the other hand, the Blair government acknowledges 
the tensions within some sections of British society are fragmented by ethnic, 
religious and cultural divisions. Ford (2005) writes that “Britain’s brittle race relations 
are at their worst in the former mill towns of East Lancashire and parts of West 
Yorkshire where white and ethnic communities lead largely separate lives. Schools 
were places of ‘virtual apartheid’ where racial conflict, harassment and ‘Islamophobia’ 
thrive”. Ford (2005) alludes to the ‘ghettoisation’ of some areas, where “communities 
had little, if anything, to do with people outside their race or religion”. In line with 
Alexander Downer’s comment above, it would seem logical to investigate the social, 
cultural, demographic, and religious differences within Australian Islamic 
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communities as one step in understanding the Australian underlying conditions 
feeding extremist sentiment.    
 
Secondly, the most recent exposure of Muslim Australians in the post 7/7 
environment is debated in terms of Muslims identifying Muslims in relation to 
exposing radical or outspoken clerics or community representatives. The effect is to 
politicise, and by implication, to suggest Muslim Australians are at least partially 
responsible for policing and informing on behalf of the government. This trend 
emerged from the British post 7/7 Muslim ‘summit’ held on 19th July, 2005, at which 
25 Muslim representatives and business leaders attended (Naughton, 2005). 
Baldwin and Webster (2005) report that “Muslim leaders will be told at a Downing 
Street conference that they should support any new laws necessary to eradicate 
what Mr Blair claims is the deep-rooted extremism within their community”. This is in 
line with an earlier agenda of winning over Muslim hearts and minds with policy 
initiatives including “anti-religious discrimination laws”, Muslim mortgages and high-
profile roles for leading Muslims (Winnet and Leppard, 2005). The most recent 
manifestation of addressing the extremist issue in Britain is the collective input of 
seven working groups set up by the Home Secretary to research issues around 
integration and tackling extremism (Home Office, 2005). In a press release issued on 
22nd September, 2005, the Home Office announced that each working group has 
focussed on one of the following workstreams: 
 
• Tackling extremism and radicalisation; 
• Engaging young people; 
• Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions; 
• Engaging with women; 
• Imam training and accreditation and the role of mosques as a source for the 
whole community; and 
• Security for the community, including tackling Islamophobia, protecting 
Muslims from extremism, and building community confidence in policing 
 
These measures appear comprehensive and inclusive as an overall attempt to 
address the multicausal issues associated with extremism. This is one area where 
Australia could improve by implementing a whole of government approach in 
addressing the underlying social issues affecting Australian Muslims.   
 
 
Legislating for a fearful society? 
 
 
Given the above analysis of the different societal conditions in Britain and Australia,  
it is questionable as to the extent of deep-rooted extremism in Australian Muslim 
communities warranting the considerable counter-terrorism upgrades. As for 
incorporating the wider Islamic communities into a unified group to unanimously 
reject terrorism, would the Australian Prime Minister gather a select group of 
mainstream Christians to denounce radical, conservative fundamentalist elements 
within the broader Christian community, and encourage locally trained clergy to 
reinforce so-called Australian values? These perceptions spring from the paucity of 
information emanating from Australian politicians in addressing the underlying 
causes of Muslim disaffection in Australia. The emphasis appears to be in reinforcing 
tighter security measures while gaining the confidence of a selected group of 
‘moderate’ Muslims. The effect will be to polarise sections of Muslim communities by 
highlighting their responsibility to control something the government is unable to do, 
and that intelligence agencies have yet to identify.   
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For the time being, current intelligence may be unable to identify the ‘new’ threat, in 
which case should Muslim communities be exposed as informers and regulators for 
either an ill-defined or non-existent risk?  The point is this: Why publicise and 
politicise this form of community responsibility when it serves no other purpose than 
to ensure mainstream community attention remains focussed on all Australian 
Muslims? This manifestation of internal community regulation was most apparent in 
the gathering of selected Muslim community representatives for the Prime Ministerial 
Summit, designed in part, to re-state the importance that “our common values as 
Australians transcend any other allegiances or commitments” (Howard, 2005). The 
next formal gathering aimed at consolidating directions on new anti-terror laws will be 
the Federal-State Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) Summit on 
September 27th. It is quite likely State representatives will support the Prime 
Minister’s upgraded counter-terrorism laws. This new wave of political 
entrepreneurship includes increasing security legislation to the point of substantial 
encroachment into civil liberty territory. Longer periods of detention without arrest, 
(state legislated for periods of up to 14 days), increased Australian Federal Police 
and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) access to airline passenger 
information; stop, question and search powers; increased surveillance, and even stiff 
penalties for leaving unattended baggage at airports are some of the additional 
counter-terrorism measures flagged as a result of the London blasts (Howard, 2005).  
 
Both Muslim community consultation and increasing legislative security measures 
have been vigorously pursued in Britain by the Blair government and copied almost 
identically by the Howard government. Yet the demographic and sociological 
circumstances are quite different in both countries.  
 
Britain has about 1.6 million Muslims and Australia 300,000. The density of some 
British Muslim communities reflects the socioeconomic conditions leading to 
alienation and disenfranchisement. About half of Britain’s Muslim population belong 
to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, which are among the most deprived 
educationally and economically (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004: 7). 
Britain’s centrality to European and Northern African Muslim populations and 
relatively relaxed immigration regime provides a haven for those seeking increased 
life-chances as well as to engage in various forms of faith practices, including the 
more radical variants associated with extremist violence. A dossier prepared for the 
British Home Office and Foreign Office in mid 2004 on Young Muslims and 
Extremism draws on intelligence and a 2003 audit paper on British Muslims by the 
Strategy Unit. The core problem addressed in the paper is the “feeling that parts of 
the Muslim community, particularly younger men, are disaffected. This includes some 
that are well educated with good economic prospects. Al Qa’eda and its off-shoots 
provide a dramatic pole of attraction for the most disaffected” (Turnbull, 2004). An 
associated briefing paper identifies “significant levels of disadvantage experienced by 
the Muslim community”…, “strong disapproval of foreign policy and significant 
concern about discrimination” (Home Office, 2003:1). Social factors such as 
education, class and ethnicity are strongly associated to socio-economic outcomes or 
attitudes rather than faith identity, but the data does not prove any association 
between disadvantage and ‘disaffection’ or ‘extremism’ (ibid.). The following is a brief 
summary of the socio-economic and Home Office Citizenship Survey data (2003: 2). 
 
• Economic activity 
Muslims (in the UK) occupy the most disadvantaged position in the labour 
market compared with other groups. Compared with the population as a 
whole, the unemployment rate for Muslims is around three times higher. 
Economic inactivity rates are higher and economic activity rates are lower. 
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• Qualifications 
Muslims are over-represented at the bottom of the qualifications rankings. 
Over two fifths have no qualifications.  
 
• Deprivation 
Muslims are over-represented in local authority areas that are deprived. The 
most deprived areas have a disproportionately higher concentration of 
Muslims. The association between deprivation and Muslim residency is 
strong.   
 
• Identity 
In terms of identity, for Muslims the role of faith for self-identity ranked second 
only to family This was also the case for other minority faiths. The importance 
of faith to self-identity is particularly strong amongst younger people. Nearly 
three quarters of young Muslims viewed religion as important to their identity, 
along with almost two thirds of Sikhs and Hindus.  
 
• Religious discrimination 
The majority of all faith groups were satisfied with government and employer 
action to protect rights of people belonging to religions. But a significant 
minority of Muslims, and especially young Muslims were not satisfied.  
 
• Active citizenship 
Regarding active citizenship, participation of Muslims is around three quarters 
of all faith communities as a whole. Young Muslims are least likely to 
participate, compared with all faith groups. Muslims are least likely of all faith 
groups to engage in volunteering. 
 
These summaries indicate substantive social issues regarding the integration of 
Muslims in British society, however, as the report mentions, “a particularly strong 
cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims including young Muslims is a perceived 
‘double standard’ in the foreign policy of western governments…” (FCO/Home Office, 
2004: 4). This is an important issue requiring attention as part of a more holistic 
approach to limiting extremism in Australia. There is a growing fear amongst 
Australian Muslims that “instead of coming out with practical steps to address 
terrorism, these laws will just work to create more intolerance towards Muslims” 
(Omran, 2005).    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
An examination and analysis of a sample of public and political discourse following 
the London bombings has demonstrated a possible knee-jerk reaction by Australia in 
following Britain in its post 7/7 responses. This is particularly evident in its haste to 
legislate strengthened counter-terrorism measures at the expense of more complex 
social research. Considerable in-country differences have been demonstrated to 
exist in terms of quantitative and qualitative social factors leading up to, and following 
the blasts in London. 
 
It remains to be seen if Australian authorities will entertain the level of understanding 
British officials have of underlying social issues relating to youth disaffection and 
deprivation. If the Muslim youth of Australia are not to be compared with British 
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Muslims then more work needs to be done to identify potential threats. Seeking to 
mobilise a government defined ‘true voice of Islam’ will not prevent the expression of 
extremist rhetoric but will tend to polarise sections of the Muslim communities. 
Attributing power to influential clerics associated with youth disaffection is a social 
problem involving the whole of society, not just Muslims. Partly this reflects the 
government’s defensiveness in justifying its weak case for joining the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ in ousting Saddam Hussein and supporting the ongoing ‘democratisation’ of 
Iraq.  
 
Community harmony will not be achieved by holding Australian Muslims hostage to 
self-policing the diversity of their communities and it fails to recognise a realist level 
of disaffection within Muslim communities regarding Australian and other Western 
governments’ foreign policy decisions. To date the Australian Government responses 
have shown little initiative other than to capitalise on the misfortunes of the British 
experience. This has been achieved by talking-up the risks of potential terrorist 
strikes while knowingly admitting the minimal threat based on available knowledge 
and intelligence. At best this could be seen as consistent with past events based on 
campaigns of public anxiety. The Indigenous Land Rights claims; boat people 
associated with the Tampa incident; the detention of asylum seekers; and the Bali 
bombings have all inspired fear-based reactions from the government. Unfortunately, 
the difficulties facing Islam at a global level are easily reproduced to justify added 
security measures at a local level.  
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